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ABSTRACT
This study examines the potential existence of a correlation between youth unemployment
and Islamic Radicalization in the MENA using data from the World Bank, the Global Terrorism
Database, and the Arab Barometer. It aims to add to the current body of research regarding
socioeconomic drivers for radicalization and terrorism.
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Introduction
The ongoing “War on Terror” is not the first of its kind. The first campaign against
terrorism began in the 1970s and persisted for 15 years. In 1973 the U.S. ambassador to Sudan was
murdered by Palestinians, and the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon was killed in 1976. The American
ambassador to Afghanistan was kidnapped and murdered in Kabul in 1979, the same year as the
Iranian Hostage Crisis. Four years later Trans World Airlines flight 843 was hijacked, and a
handicapped American vacationer was killed after he was pushed into the Mediterranean sea in his
wheelchair by terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise ship. Also in 1983, a car bomb
struck the U.S. embassy in Beirut, claiming 46 lives. Only six months later, terrorists drove an
explosive laden van onto the United States Marine Corps barracks compound at the Beirut airport,
and killed 241 U.S. Marines.
In 1985 President Reagan ordered airstrikes on Libyan installments on Muammar
Qaddafi’s personal compound in response to the bombing of a Berlin discotheque that was linked
to the Libyan Prime Minister. Qaddafi’s life was spared but one of his daughters was killed. After
the American airstrikes in Libya, the threat of terrorism waned significantly and was thought to be
all but completely diminished. It was not. In 1989, a bomb detonated aboard Pan Am Flight 103
in Scotland and left zero survivors. All 259 people aboard the plane died, as did 11 others on the
ground when the fuselage fell to earth and struck a small neighborhood. The attack had been
planned by a cabal of Middle Eastern state supporters of terrorism, including Muammar Qaddafi.
The terrorism that confronted the West 40 years ago was much different from what we see today.
The terrorists in this first war were motivated primarily by political issues.1 It largely lacked the
religious element that makes fighting terrorism such a more difficult task today. The current
1

Chanda, Nayan, Paul Kennedy, and Strobe Talbott. The Age of Terror: America and the World After Sept Ll. New
York: Basic Books, 2001, 85.
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struggle against terrorism still has much in common with what happened in the 70s and 80s, seen
most vividly in how Qaddafi and his peers struck back with the Pan Am 103 bombing. Retaliation
only generates another round of terrorism; eradication is the only way to get rid of the threat.2
Since the United States launched its more recent, full scale campaign against radicalism spawning
in the Middle East, the frequency of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks has increased sharply. In
2001, there were fewer than 100 terror attacks carried out by radical Muslim perpetrators. In 2015,
the number was over 2,700.3
Alongside the U.S. led physical battle against terrorism that has droned on since 9/11,
researchers at universities, government agencies, and NGOs have continuously built upon an evergrowing body of research concerning what causes Islamic extremist radicalization in the first
place. Ideally, if one were to identify a specific societal phenomenon that pushes people toward
Islamic extremism, then governments could enact the appropriate political or economic measures
to stop that phenomenon. If this could be achieved, then it would be possible to stop terrorism
before it ever happens by eliminating the societal factors that make Islamic extremism seem like
the best direction for some people to take their lives in. It would make it possible to fight terrorism
without having to put boots on the ground, costing the lives of coalition forces and, as statistics
have shown, only making the problem worse. But this goal, so far, appears to be little more than a
far-fetched and idealistic dream. Throughout all of this extensive research the indication is seldom
that some driver for radicalization seems plausible; instead the pool of factors that are found not
to be drivers for radicalization becomes larger. That does not mean that it is impossible, or that we
should give up on trying to figure it out. Each time research shows that something does not

2

Chanda, Nayan, Paul Kennedy, and Strobe Talbott. The Age of Terror: America and the World After Sept Ll. New
York: Basic Books, 2001,, 87.
3
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Global Terrorism Database
University of Maryland, 2016.
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correlate with Islamic radicalization, it narrows the possibilities of what that missing driver, or
likely what combination of drivers, for radicalization could be. If it exists, someone will find it
eventually. Finding what is not a driver toward radicalization precipitates greater understanding of
modern terrorism, the majority of which has roots in the Middle East North Africa region by means
of ideology or perpetuator origins.
The MENA is second only to sub-Saharan Africa in (proportionally) large youth population
size, and many of its countries also have abnormally high youth unemployment rates. Jordan is
currently at the top of that list. According to data from the International Labor Organization, youth
unemployment rose between 2009 to 2018 in Jordan.4 This reached an apex in 2014, the same year
that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Islamic State’s worldwide
Caliphate. He urged Muslims across the world to immigrate to the Islamic State with the goal of
one day conquering Rome and Spain in the name of an extreme interpretation Salafist Sunni Islam.
The newly minted organization lauded the importance of physical Jihadism in returning to what
supporters believe to be true Sunni Islam. Recruits from countries across the world indeed began
traveling to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State, as did radical Salafi adherents from the Middle
East and North Africa.
Jordan shares borders with both Iraq and Syria and saw increases in relative youth
unemployment rates throughout the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). I argue that the
Hashemite Kingdom is a strong medium through which to examine drivers for increases in rates
of radicalization in the MENA region. Bearing this in mind, does youth unemployment in Jordan
correlate with higher propensity to Islamic radicalization?

4

International Labor Organization. “Youth Unemployment (as a % of total labor force aged 15-24).” Accessed
October 28 2019.
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Framework
The academic discourse on the determinants and drivers of terrorism and Islamic
radicalization is extensive, but research on youth unemployment as a specific determinant for
terrorism in the MENA (Middle East, North Africa) region is relatively limited.5 Bagchi and Paul
indicate that prior research does, however, more often examine the impacts of youth bulge,
unemployment (in general), and inequality more extensively in relation to terrorism.
Henrik Urdal hypothesizes that a country with an abnormally large youth bulge is more
vulnerable to violence, including terrorism.6 Urdal uses the following reasons for this hypothesis:
A country’s failure to absorb the disproportionately high youth population into the labor market
creates a sense of resentment among the youth. This abandonment makes it easier for terrorist
organizations of all types to recruit these individuals, as the opportunity cost for an unemployed
young man is significantly lower than that of one who is employed. Many researchers also see
unemployment as a likely determinant of terrorism. For instance, James Piazza asserts, “the
average national unemployment rate for each country would be expected to bear a significant
positive relationship with terrorism, as unemployment precipitates the stress of idle workers who
might suffer from unmet economic expectations and therefore turn to political violence.”7
Additionally, Bagchi notes inequality as another possible determinant for terrorism studied more
extensively than youth unemployment. The discrepancy between individuals’ expected and actual

5

Bagchi, Aniruddha and Jomon A. Paul. "Youth Unemployment and Terrorism in the MENAP (Middle East, North
Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) Region." Socio-EconomicPlanning Sciences 64, (2018): 9.
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Urdal, H. “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence.” International Studies Quarterly 50
(2006): 609.
7
Piazza, JA. “Rooted in Poverty: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and
Political Violence 18 (2006): 160.
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well-being as a result of inadequate employment opportunities generates “collective discontent,
and ultimately terrorism.”8
Surprisingly, political economist Martin Gassebner saw little success in finding that youth
bulge, unemployment, or inequality had any impacts on terrorism or radicalization. Bagchi
postulates that the question of whether the three of these factors together can cause terrorism will
yield more positive results, and states that youth unemployment can be used as an amalgamation
of the three as it is related to each of them.9 Most governments throughout the Middle East and
North Africa pay for free secondary education, but this system is now strained because of the youth
bulge throughout the region. The World Bank states that the MENA region “has not capitalized
fully on past investments in education. [...] The education systems did not produce what the
markets needed, and the markets were not sufficiently developed to absorb the educated labor force
into the most sufficient uses.”10 This issue is only getting worse, as government expenditures on
education as a percentage of total government expenditures in Jordan, for example, rose from 12%
in 2017 to 28.5% in 2018.11 Dalacoura also posits that Islamist terrorists are often a “mix of
educated middle-class leaders and working class dropouts.”12
Furthermore, if there is high unemployment amongst a group of people, even members of
the group who are employed will become resentful. “Social identity theory,” which considers the
consequences of personal and social identities for individual perceptions and group behavior, states
that widespread unemployment will motivate even employed persons to lash out because they will

8

Bagchi, Aniruddha and Jomon A. Paul. "Youth Unemployment and Terrorism in the MENAP (Middle East, North
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World Bank. The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (2008).
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UNESCO Institute for Statistics. “Government expenditure on education, total (% of government expenditure).”
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interpret unemployment within their social group as a personal grievance as well.13 Hence, youth
unemployment impacts terrorism in two ways. First, on the “demand side,” because extensive
youth unemployment creates resentment and breeds demand for terrorism. Second, on the “supply
side,” because unemployed young people are easy targets for terrorist recruitment.14
This paper utilizes the impacts of youth unemployment on terrorism based on Bagchi’s
rationale that youth unemployment is an effective metric when examining socioeconomic drivers
for terrorism in the MENA region. The United Nations defines youth unemployment as the
situation of young people who are looking for but cannot find a job, who are between 15-24 years
old.15
A recent examination of the links between ISIS recruitment found that economic conditions
do not increase ISIS membership, but that the number of foreign fighters in ISIS is positively
correlated to GDP per capita and Human Development Index (HDI).

16

It is important to note;

however, that this study focused more exclusively on foreign membership from Western countries
such as France and Germany. I intend to contrast the findings of Efraim Benmelech and Esteban
Klor with those of Mohamed Abdel Jelil et al. to highlight the differences in drivers of
radicalization in the MENA itself versus more distant western countries. Jelil contends that
unemployment is indeed a driver for Islamic radicalization.17 On the other hand, Benmelech and
Klor claim that unemployment, income inequality and low GDP per capita cannot be seen as
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Klor, Esteban and Efraim Benmelech. What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2016.
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2018.
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realistic drivers for terrorism because countries that do not struggle in these areas still see relatively
high rates of radicalization when compared to countries in the Middle East.
Among those who agree on the significance of lack of opportunity, several researchers
interpret the effects of these socioeconomic issues on radicalism differently. For example, Bagchi
and Paul argue that youth unemployment increases domestic terrorism in the MENA region, but
they also claim that youth unemployment does not have significant effects on transnational
terrorism, or instances of terrorism in a country concerns victims of perpetrators from another.18
However, much of the data used in the aforementioned study was collected earlier than 2012, well
before the rise of the Islamic State. I argue that Bagchi’s research can be updated to indicate a
correlation between unemployment and radicalization during and after the rise of ISIS.
In their article Unemployment and Violent Extremism: Evidence from Daesh Foreign
Recruits, Jelil, Bhatia, Brockmeyer, Do, and Joubert confidently argue that lack of economic
opportunities directly explains foreign enrollment in ISIS (a transnational Islamic terrorist
organization). My own research will align most closely with this 2018 study, though I will go
further by indicating correlations between youth unemployment problems in the MENA region
and Islamic terror as a whole, rather than ISIS alone.
The analysis chapter will examine both quantitative and qualitative findings on Jordanians’
opinions on the problem of unemployment in the country. Previous studies have focused almost
exclusively on statistics detached from the personal experiences of citizens in the MENA region,
but it is also important to gain a better understanding of authentic opinions in order to fully
understand, and perhaps to act upon, how lack of opportunity drives radicalization.

18
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Background & Methods
Radicalist violence, though seen at lower levels in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan than
in most other Arab nations in the MENA, remains a relevant factor in analysis of the state. 19 In
August 2018 Jordanian gendarmerie conducted a raid in Al Salt, just 18 miles northwest of
Amman, on a house that was suspected to be the hideout of a group of extremist Muslims who had
previously conducted a bomb attack. When the Jordanian security forces entered the residence the
radical militants detonated explosives throughout the house, killing four Jordanian servicemen and
injuring 16 civilians. Five Jordanian nationals claiming allegiance to the Islamic State were found
responsible for the bombing. The suspects had buried an extensive quantity of explosives near the
house; intended for later terror attacks on civilians and security forces. The incident in Al Salt
destroyed the nebulous sense of calm that was present in Jordan even during the Islamic State’s
height. Researchers at the Soufan Center see attacks like this as a sign of things to come as
members of the beleaguered Islamic State make their way out of Syria.20 Over 3,000 Jordanians
have traveled to Syria or Iraq in recent years to fight for ISIS. This makes Jordan the third largest
source of foreign fighters to the Islamic state behind Russia and Saudi Arabia. Presumably, many
ex-ISIS fighters will return to their home countries following ISIS’s loss of its last territory in
Eastern Syria in March 2019.21 “It seems probable that the influence and involvement of returnees
[in terrorist activity in their home countries] will grow as their numbers increase.”22

19

9 attacks in 2016
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Global Terrorism Database
University of Maryland, 2016.
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The Soufan Center (TSC) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to serving as a resource and forum for research,
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21
Barrett, Richard. Beyond The Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees. The Soufan Center, 2017.
22
Ibid
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The fact alone that 3,000 Jordanians entered Syria to fight for Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s
Islamic state shows that the Kingdom of Jordan is particularly susceptible to Islamic radicalization
when compared to other nations in the MENA. According to the International Labor Organization,
Jordan also has a relatively high percentage of youth unemployment when compared to the rest of
the region. Youth unemployment in Jordan rose from 28% in 2014 to 35% in 2016, while the
average rate of youth unemployment across the MENA was only 22% in 2016.23 As stated in the
theoretical framework, youth unemployment is an effective metric to examine because it serves as
an amalgamation of other important factors such as youth bulge, unemployment, and income
inequality. Each of these metrics have been studied independently in relation to radicalism and
extremist violence, but research using youth unemployment remains limited.
Given that Jordan has had a high rate of radicalization and high youth unemployment rates,
the country is an ideal subject to use for a micro-level analysis of the relationship between youth
unemployment and radicalization.
Figure 1:
Jordanians who have “little to no trust in their own government”

23

Survey Group

% 2013

% 2018

Unemployed Youth Pop.

41%

51%

Total Unemployed Pop.

41%

58%

Youth Pop.

33%

54%

Total Pop.

38%

59%

International Labor Organization. “Youth Unemployment (as a % of total labor force aged 15-24).” Accessed
October 28 2019.
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Data from the Arab Barometer survey waves in 2013 and 2018 shows a high and increasing
level of distrust in the Jordanian government. Well over half of the entire Jordanian population
responded “little trust” or “no trust” when asked how much trust they had in their own government.
Jordanians’ growing frustration and lack of faith in their own government should also indicate a
higher propensity toward radicalization in the Kingdom, as citizens’ disillusionment and
skepticism over a government’s capability and devotion to its people can sometimes act as a
catalyst for terrorism.24
The World Development Indicators from the World Bank database, the Global Terrorism
Database, and results from the Arab Barometer surveys provide the statistics necessary for
examining this relationship. The World Development Indicators database compiles data collected
by a plethora of research and outreach organizations such as the International Labor Organization,
UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and of course the World Bank itself. It includes
extensive data on all forms of unemployment, including youth unemployment, for the past 20 years
for almost every country in the Middle East and North Africa. It even includes unemployment data
for countries like Libya and Syria that are weathering periods of turmoil and civil war. The World
Development Indicators database can be particularly fruitful when used in conjunction with other
databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database.
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was built by and is maintained by the START
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of
Maryland. It contains data on every single terrorist attack, relating to religion and otherwise,
successful or unsuccessful, since 1970. The database includes details such as the perpetrators’

24
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nationalities, the targets’ nationalities, the method of the attack, the reasoning for and/or group
behind the attack, and much more. This means researchers can filter the data to determine very
specific types of attacks. For example, when investigating youth unemployment and radicalization
in Jordan, one can query the database to populate results about Islamic extremist attacks during a
certain period of time in Jordan, or by Jordanian aggressors.
Data from the World Development Indicators and the GTD are useful when comparing
larger sets of data that are not found in the same database. However, the Arab Barometer has an
important advantage in that its surveys can provide insights at the individual level. The Arab
Barometer aims to obtain online survey results from at least 1,200 citizens in each country across
the MENA during each wave of surveys (which typically occur once every two to three years),
and often they acquire many more results than this. Between the last three waves, the Arab
Barometer has taken in around 50,000 individual surveys. The 2013 and 2018 survey waves
obtained the most robust results, with respondents from 12 countries across the region including
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Palestine, Sudan, and
Yemen. The 2016 survey wave only reached 7 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia. In each sweeping survey, after asking for general demographic
information, the survey asks respondents questions relating to everything from religion, to social
welfare, to sentiments about their government and international relations, to their own family
structure. Arab Barometer data is unique because it permits users to see what people of a certain
age, nationality, economic, or marital status (or all of these) answer when asked specific sets of
questions.
This research compares responses to survey questions from different social groups by
presenting the amount of respondents who answered a certain way as a percentage of that whole
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social group. This makes it possible to directly compare the sentiments of the unemployed youth
population with those of the general population despite the fact that the general population, of
course, will have many more survey results.
Examining responses to the Arab Barometer’s questions most closely related to violence
against the west does raise concern over how reliable responses are. Social desirability bias likely
lead some survey respondents to withhold the complete truth when completing survey questions
regarding such contentious subjects. Despite the fact that Arab Barometer survey takers are
explicitly informed that their identities will be kept anonymous, the desire to present themselves
in a more socially acceptable way could still persist in some instances. In the case of the questions
analyzed here, respondents may have had a lower likelihood of admitting to sympathizing with
violence against the West. However, I argue that this tendency does not compromise the value of
this research. All survey respondents would have been exposed to a similar amount of pressure to
as a result of social desirability bias. While percentages of respondents supporting violence might
be marginally lower across the board, the comparison of these percentages between countries, age
groups, and employment statuses still bear value.

Ray 17
Micro Analysis
Figure 2:

Jordanian youth unemployment data from the World Bank and data on the number of
terrorist attacks in Jordan from the Global Terrorism Database show a simultaneous spike in both
variables in 2016. Youth unemployment rose above 35%, and there were 11 terror attacks. Terror
attack frequency was low in 2013 and 2014, as was the youth unemployment rate. A correlation is
visible here; however, this could be coincidental, moreover it fails to provide information on
radicalization as a whole. Instead, it accounts for those who decided to act upon radicalism by
going through with terror attacks. The Arab Barometer surveys administered in 2013, 2016, and
2018 do, however, include several questions that can be linked to propensity toward radicalization.
The same questions are not asked in each survey, which means that we cannot necessarily compare
data over time in relation to changes in youth unemployment over time. Instead we can filter the
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survey results to respondents who are under the age of 25 (the minimum age to respond to the
Arab Barometer is 17), and analyze how these respondents answered questions related to
radicalization. Most prior studies have simply compared separate data on radicalization and
unemployment, such as Bagchi’s 2017 study which compared terror attack frequency with metrics
like military expenditure. Using the Arab Barometer makes it possible to analyze responses related
to radicalism from people who are known to be both young and unemployed.
In 2013 the Arab Barometer asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement, “The United States interference in the region justifies armed operations against the U.S.
everywhere.” The 2018 questionnaire similarly asked whether survey takers agreed or disagreed
that “Violence against the United States is a logical consequence of their interference in the Arab
region.” The UK government defines Islamic radicalism as “any form of Islam that opposes
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths
and beliefs.” Therefore, positive answers to these questions should indicate a correlation with
radicalization, and perhaps a stronger propensity toward radicalization. If one supports violence
against western nations and decides to take action, then he or she would presumably take the most
formalized route. In the Middle East this would lead people to join radical Islamic groups like the
Islamic State and al Qaeda.

Ray 19
Figure 3:
Jordanians agreeing that “The United States interference in the region justifies armed
operations against the U.S. everywhere”
Survey Group

% in agreement 2013

% in agreement 2018

Unemployed Youth Pop.

46%

65%

Total Unemployed Pop.

46%

59%

Youth Pop.

43%

62%

Total Pop.

41%

62.4%

In an analysis of Jordanians who agreed with the statement, 3% more of the unemployed
Jordanian youth population agreed with the statement than the total Jordanian youth population in
both 2013 and 2018. 6% more of the unemployed youth population supported the statement than
did the total unemployed population. This gap between the responses of employed and
unemployed young people remained constant over the 5 year gap. The rate of 46% of the
unemployed youth population in agreement seen in 2013 was 5% higher than the general Jordanian
population in the same year, but this gap closed to 2.6% in the 2018 wave of surveys. The rate of
positive responses to the statement by unemployed youth did not increase at a significantly higher
rate than other groups in 2018 when unemployment reached its highest point, save for the total
unemployed population. However, positive responses by unemployed young people do remain
higher in general between 2013 and 2018.
As youth unemployment rose by 7.3% from 2013 to 2018, understandably the number of
Jordanian Arab Barometer survey respondents who were young and unemployed increased from
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83 to 100 individuals between 2013 and 2018. The total Jordanian youth population polled
remained at exactly 402. Rather than seeing more radicalist tendencies only among the young
unemployed population over time, these tendencies increased at a near exactly uniform rate of
20% among each of the three groups as the unemployed youth population grew. Here it is
important to reiterate that the hypothesis does not say that young unemployed people are more
likely to radicalize. Instead it says that as the unemployed youth population increases, so too will
overall propensity toward radicalization.
Applying the Social Identity Theory assists in understanding the relationship between this
sizeable overall increase in anti-western sentiment and increased youth unemployment, which rose
from 30% in 2013 to 37% in 2018. Social Identity Theory deals with the idea that the “self is
reflexive and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social
categories or classification.” 25 It means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the
group, and seeing things from the group’s perspective. Bagchi notes that the theory states that
widespread unemployment will motivate even employed persons to lash out because they will
interpret unemployment within their social group as a personal grievance as well.26 This would not
indicate that the unemployed youth population shows any significantly stronger proclivity toward
radicalization than the general population, but it could point to youth unemployment’s correlation
to the entire population’s proclivity to radicalize.
In order to measure overall resentment among the Jordanian population versus simply
resentment against the United States, we can examine Jordanians’ responses when asked how

25
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much they trust their own government (see figure 1). The unemployed population’s level of trust
is not significantly lower than that of the rest of the population over time. However, the amount of
distrust among all Jordanians for their own government increased at a remarkably similar rate to
the responses regarding support for violence against the United States. The percentage of citizens
in support of violence against the United States increased by 21% between 2013 and 2018, and the
percentage of citizens who had little to no trust in the government increased by 23% in the same
period of time. This clear similarity adds substance to the observation that frustration among the
Jordanian population increased at a significant rate between 2013 and 2018. Still, close
examination of a link between youth unemployment and radicalization demands the analysis of
questions more directly related to radicalism.
Figure 4:
Jordanians in support of Daesh’s use of violence:
Survey Group

% in support 2016

Unemployed Youth Pop.

3.2%

Total Unemployed Pop.

1.4%

Youth Pop.

1.6%

Total Pop.

0.7%

In the 2016 survey wave only, the Arab Barometer asked respondents whether or not they
supported the Islamic State’s (or Daesh’s) use of violence in its extremist operations. While an
examination of how responses to this question changed over time as youth unemployment in
Jordan spiked could provide more powerful information, comparing the responses for one year
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alone still contributes value. Figure 4 shows the percentage of the youth unemployed population,
the total unemployed population, the total youth population, and the total population who support
ISIS’s use of violence, and shows that 3.2%, 1.4%, 1.6%, and 0.7%, respectively, were in support.
Though these percentages are small, they show nonetheless that the Jordanian unemployed youth
population is 80% more likely to approve of ISIS’s use of violence than is the general population,
50% more likely to do so than the total youth population, and over twice as likely as the total
unemployed population. Furthermore, this higher sympathy with radicalism among the
unemployed youth population was measured at the same time that other metrics that are often tied
to radicalization were on the rise.
In summary, Youth unemployment in Jordan rose by 7.3% from 2013 to 2018, according
to the World Bank. The percentage of unemployed youth who distrusted the Jordanian government
rose by 10%, and the percentage of unemployed youth who supported violent action against the
United States increased by 19% during those 5 years. In 2016, unemployed young people were
80% more likely than the general population to agree with the Islamic State’s violent tactics.
Lastly, the Global Terrorism Database shows that the number of Islamic extremist attacks in Jordan
in 2018 was double that of 2013.
Thus far the hypothesis that youth unemployment correlates with Islamic radicalization in
Jordan appears plausible. However, a macro-level analysis comparing the results of each of the
metrics used in this chapter across the entire Middle East and North Africa to the results from
Jordan alone can further solidify, or disprove, the validity of the hypothesis. The youth
unemployment rate in Jordan increased more abruptly and reached a higher rate in general than
almost any other nation in the Middle East and North Africa (only Libya reached a higher rate of
unemployment). Therefore, if the hypothesis is true, the signs for youth unemployment as an
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indicator for propensity toward radicalization should be stronger for Jordan than for the entire
MENA region as a whole.
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Macro-Analysis
The developing world is currently experiencing its largest youth cohort to date, and the
Arab world is the most affected by the inflation of the youth population.27 The Middle East and
North Africa region is the youngest in the world. Today’s global youth are more likely to be
pursuing an education than any previous generation, but this desire for educational attainment may
cause unexpected negative outcomes in the MENA region. Countless political officials and
researchers alike subscribe to the belief that a lack of education leads to a higher propensity for
radicalization. However, the discovery of evidence to the contrary has come closer to outweighing
the prevalence of the aforementioned “opportunity cost” theory. The verifiable evidence
investigators have collected so far does not clearly support the idea that education level reduces a
person’s desire to join a violent extremist organization. Rather, Berrebi notes, “if anything, the
findings suggest that those with higher educational attainment and higher living standards are more
likely to participate in terrorist activity.”28
That is not to say that unemployment has nothing to do with radicalization. Jordan as well
as the rest of the MENA provides an impressive level of educational opportunity (currently Jordan
maintains over 95% secondary school enrollment). When the students graduate from these
generally state-sponsored schools, finding work proves exceedingly difficult. We see a
phenomenon in which the government fosters a sense of false hope by successfully providing free
secondary education and then promptly lets graduates down by failing to provide work
opportunities. Bearing this in mind, “educated individuals would be particularly frustrated by the
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loss of economic opportunities and alternative economic cost of their risking arrest or worse would
be lower.”29 If this theory holds true then Jordanian citizens should exhibit a higher propensity
toward radicalization than other countries in the region because Jordan has a strong education
system while youth unemployment currently rests at over 36%.
The micro analysis chapter already highlighted a correlation between youth unemployment
and drivers for radicalization within Jordan alone. A more concrete analysis necessitates a
comparison with the rest of the region. Like those in the previous chapter, this chapter’s charts
include information on four distinct population groups in the total MENA Jordanian populations:
the total population, the total unemployed population, the youth population (from ages 17 to 25),
and the unemployed youth population. Figure 5 compares the percentage of Jordanians with the
percentage of citizens across the Middle East and North Africa who agree that United States
interference in the region justifies armed operations against the US everywhere. If the percentages
taken from the Jordanians’ responses to the Arab Barometer are higher, then the presence of a
correlation between youth unemployment and radicalization could be likely.
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Figure 5:
Arab Barometer survey takers agreeing that “The United States interference in the region
justifies armed operations against the U.S. everywhere”
Survey Group

% in agreement 2013

% in agreement 2018

MENA Unemployed Youth Pop.

46%

60%

Jordanian Unemployed Youth Pop.

46%

65%

MENA Total Unemployed Pop.

45%

59%

Jordanian Total Unemployed Pop.

46%

59%

MENA Youth Pop.

46%

62%

Jordanian Youth Pop.

43%

62%

Total MENA Pop.

45%

59%

Total Jordanian Pop.

41%

62%

In 2013, exactly equal percentages of the unemployed youth population in Jordan and in
the entire Arab world agreed that violence against the United States was justified. By 2018, as
youth unemployment in Jordan continued to spike, the percentage of young unemployed
Jordanians who supported violence against Americans increased by a full 19% to a total of 65%.
In the Middle East and North Africa as a whole, the number reached only 60% by 2018. The
changes were similar for the total youth populations. By 2018 62% of Jordanians and 62% of
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citizens throughout the region between ages 17 and 25 said they supported violent action against
the United States. However, this number rose from 46% of young citizens of the MENA in 2013
and from only 43% of young Jordanians, meaning the percentage of young Jordanians that
endorsed violence against the U.S. increased at a faster rate. The difference in the rate of increase
in support for anti-Western sentiment between the MENA’s total unemployed population and
Jordan’s total unemployed population was insignificant; each group increased its support by
approximately 14% over the 5 year span.
Interestingly, the disparity between changing opinions in Jordan versus the whole region
is the most visible in the general population’s responses to this question, rather than in responses
from young, unemployed, or young unemployed people. Amongst the total Jordanian population
that the Arab Barometer surveys reached, the percentage that supporting violence against America
rose by 21% between 2013 and 2018, from 41% to 62%. The total surveyed population of the
MENA saw an increase of only 14%, rising from 45% to 59%, the smallest increase in percentage
seen in any of the survey groups in Figure 5.
Comparing Jordanians’ responses with responses collected region-wide shows that in
Jordan, all but one of these population groups’ disdain for the West increased more rapidly and
reached a higher percentage of the population than did the same groups in the rest of the MENA.
Increasing anti-United States sentiments increased 4% more rapidly among young unemployed
Jordanians versus the rest of the region, and 6% more rapidly among the general Jordanian
population between 2013 and 2018. During that same period of time, the youth unemployment rate
calculated from Arab Barometer survey data alone (rather than larger scale data sources such as
the World Bank) showed an overall decrease in the MENA’s youth unemployment rate, falling
from 23% to 21%. In Jordan, Arab Barometer results show an increase of 5%, from 20% to 25%
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in the youth unemployment rate (see figure 6). Consequently, the relative change in youth
unemployment and responses to the survey question concerning violence against Americans was
nearly identical in Jordan.
Figure 6:
Youth unemployment rate calculated from Arab Barometer data alone:
Survey Location

2013

2018

MENA

23%

21%

Jordan

20%

25%

The comparison presented in figure 5 also indicates a correlation between youth
unemployment and radicalization. Jordan underwent a higher and more rapid spike in youth
unemployment than anywhere else in the region between 2013 and 2018, and during that time
violent sentiment for the West also increased significantly more among Jordanians. Still, the
question of whether respondents did or did not support violence against the United States is not a
telltale indicator for propensity for involvement in Islamic extremism. The question from wave IV
of the Arab Barometer wave (2016) that asked respondents whether they agreed with the Islamic
State’s use of violence, however, is as close as one can hope to get while still expecting respondents
to provide truthful answers.
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Figure 7:
1. Total Arab Barometer survey takers in support of Daesh’s use of violence:
Survey Group

% in support 2016

MENA Unemployed Youth Pop.

3.1%

Jordanian Unemployed Youth

1.9%

Pop.
MENA Total Unemployed Pop.

2.3%

Jordanian Total Unemployed Pop.

1.4%

MENA Youth Pop.

1.9%

Jordanian Youth Pop.

1.4%

Total MENA Pop.

1.7%

Total Jordanian Pop.

0.7%

While the data in figure 7 still show that the youth unemployed population as well as the
youth population exhibit a higher propensity to radicalization both within Jordan and beyond its
borders in the rest of the MENA, the chart yields a different result than the previous one. In each
population group examined, a higher percentage of citizens throughout the entire Middle East
supported ISIS’s use of violence than did Jordanians alone. Oddly, the gap between the opinions
of the youth unemployed populations in Jordan versus MENA-wide is the largest of the three
population groups.
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Overall, figure 7 indicates that youth unemployment does not correlate with propensity to
radicalize. The question now becomes, why do responses seen in figure 5 (relating to support for
violence against America) seem to support the hypothesis, while the responses presented in figure
7 do not? The problem could lie in the fact that the question concerning the Islamic State was only
asked in the year 2016, and therefore did not allow for a complete analysis of how responses
evolved over time. Jordan’s youth unemployment rate is currently climbing higher than the rest of
the nations in the MENA today. Its continuous upsurge in the past five to ten years could mean
that responses to questions used to explore its potential correlation to other factors must also be
observable over a certain period of time, rather than in just one instance, in order to yield more
fruitful results.
For example, in 2016 unemployment in Jordan rose rapidly, but Tunisia was still riding out
the effects of the Arab Spring in 2011 and youth unemployment was still on its way down from
2011’s remarkably high rate of 42%. The two countries’ unemployment rates matched one another
in that year, despite the fact that one was declining and the other was rising. Jordan’s youth
unemployment rate had not yet had enough time to pull away from the rest of the region in 2016,
and therefore it is understandable that its potential effects would not have had as much of a visible
impact as data collected more recently and continuously. While the use of data collected in a single
year may or may not give rise to problems, this should not mean that figure 7 is useless. Instead it
may indeed show that youth unemployment does not correlate with propensity to radicalization
after all.
The charts in this macro-analysis chapter compare Jordan with the other countries that were
polled by the Arab Barometer in 2016. This means that, in essence, the conglomerated MENA
data should be seen as having its own youth unemployment rate when considering its significance

Ray 31
versus Jordan’s data. So although Jordan’s youth unemployment rate intersected with Tunisia’s in
that year, the “overall MENA” unemployment rate that the Jordanian data it is being compared to
saw an overall decline (see figure 6). Thus, the fact that each of the population groups in Jordan
harbored less support for ISIS’s use of violence than the MENA-wide survey groups means that
data in figure 7 contradicts the hypothesis.
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Conclusion
This research has examined the potential relationships between Islamic radicalization and
youth unemployment in the case of Jordan, drawing on statistics from the Arab Barometer surveys
conducted in 2013, 2016, and 2018. Utilizing survey responses from the Arab Barometer made it
possible to examine direct responses from people who are known to be young and unemployed,
rather than to simply compare a detached unemployment statistic alongside the frequency of terror
attacks.
Inside Jordan alone, the young unemployed population showed a higher propensity to
extremist radicalization than did the rest of the population. This held true after investigating results
concerning the support for violence against the United States as well as the support for the Islamic
State’s use of violence. Jordan’s youth unemployment rate spiked in 2016 and again in 2018, and
as hypothesized, a higher percentage of the unemployed youth population in Jordan supported
violence against the United States in 2018 than in 2013. Furthermore, general support for violence
against the West grew at a uniform rate of 20% for each population group examined. Similarly,
when Jordanians were asked whether they supported Daesh’s use of violence, the unemployed
youth population held more support than other population groups. Thus, the micro-analysis
research upholds the hypothesis that youth unemployment correlates with propensity to
radicalization in Jordan.
Jordan currently has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the MENA region,
and it has grown alarmingly quickly. If likelihood of radicalization indeed correlates with youth
unemployment, then Jordan should have higher per-capita support for violence against the West
as well as more support for ISIS’s use of violence. In the macro-analysis section, a comparison of
Jordanians’ support for violence against the U.S. proved to be higher than per capita support for
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violence against the U.S. across the Arab World. The comparison of responses regarding support
for ISIS’s violence yielded different results. In 2016, Jordan displayed a lower level of support
than its neighbors did for the Islamic State’s tactics. Therefore the macro-analysis yielded slightly
conflicting results. However, results to questions asked on the 2016 Arab Barometer survey may
be a poor metric to use with respect to correlation with increased youth unemployment in Jordan.
The Jordanian youth unemployment rate reached its apex in 2016, and it is possible that the effects
of the spike may not have taken effect by the time of the administration of the 2016 survey.
In conclusion, using Arab Barometer data to investigate youth unemployment’s
relationship with propensity to radicalization in Jordan shows that while a positive relationship
between the two is highly plausible, it does not completely prove the hypothesis. The survey
questions used are not an ideal way to measure a population group’s likelihood of radicalization.
They may measure how much youth unemployment correlates with sympathy toward
radicalization, but not one’s willingness to act on borderline-radicalist beliefs. Data even more
directly related to radicalization would be necessary to get closer to a definitive answer.
Unfortunately, the accessibility of this data may be a near insurmountable challenge unless the
researcher worked for a government agency with access to more information than what the average
citizen may view. Prison and arrest records from Middle Eastern and North African countries
would be a promising start.
The ultimate goal of this research was to come closer to putting a finger on whether youth
unemployment should be seen as a potential driver for radicalization, or whether it should be added
to the pool of socioeconomic factors that certainly are not. Based on the results from comparing
Arab Barometer survey data, youth unemployment should not yet be placed in the latter category.
More research on the relationship between radicalization and terrorism and youth unemployment,
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or perhaps simply with high youth populations alone, should be conducted in order to come to a
completely decisive answer. Even still, given radicalization’s ambiguous nature as it occurs on a
completely individual level, the likelihood of ever finding a single key socioeconomic driver for
Islamic extremist radicalization is slim.
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